Recent Engish Decisions by Editors,
BALLARD v. TOMLINSON.
of payment out of them, consequently such tolls are subject of
garnishment: Leedom v. Plymouth By. Co., 5 W. & S. 265.
Evidence.-As before stated when a corporation is garnished it
may answer by its proper corporate officer, so the officers and
employees of the corporation are competent witnesses to testify as
to an indebtedness or property sought to be garnished, but such
corporate officers or agents must be those whose business it is to
attend to the debt, claim or property in dispute. Thus a railroad
company having been summoned as a garnishee, and a jury having
been empanelled to try whether it has made a full disclosure of
its indebtedness to the defendant in the action, the statements of a
division engineer to a third person in relation to the indebtedness
of the company to the defendant are not competent evidence, it not
appearing that such engineer was an agent of the company having
any authority on this subject, or that at the time of making the state-
ments he was engaged as agent about the business referred to so as
to make his statements part of the transaction and explanatory of
the nature thereof: Balt. & Ohio Bd. Co. v. Gallaliue's Adm'r, 12
Gratt. 655. After judgment has been rendered against the gar-
nishee interest is chargeable upon money in his hands from the
time of the demand made upon him for it: Williams v. Andros-





There is no property in underground water percolating in unknown channels, but
every landowner has, as incident to the ownership of the land, an unlimited right
of appropriating such water in its natural state by lawful, even if artificial, means,
and can maintain an action against any one interfering with that right by contami-
nating the water.
The plaintiff and the defendant were the owners of two wells, the water for which
was drawn from the same strata. The water in the plaintiff's well rose by natural
pressure, to within twenty-seven feet of the surface, whence he raised it by pumping.
The water in the plaintiff's well was fouled by sewage discharged by the defendant
into his well. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the
defendant from using his well so as to pollute the water in the plaintifps well, and
also to damages for the injury which he had suffered by such pollution
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APPEAL of the plaintiff from the judgment of PEARSON, J.
The action was for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
so using his well, as to pollute water in, or coming into, the plain-
tiff's well, and for damages for the injury caused by such pollution.
The facts were as follows:-
Since 1849 the plaintiff, a brewer at Brentford, drew water from
a well sunk to the depth of 222 feet into the London clay, and
bricked round. From the bottom of the well, a pipe was carried
through the Thanet sand into the chalk, to a depth of 300 feet from
the surface. From the sand and chalk, which were water-bearing
strata, the water found its way, by natural pressure, into the well
to within twenty-seven feet of the surface, whence the plaintiff
raised it by pumping. About ninety-nine yards from that well the
defendant had a well of similar construction and depth, and going
down through the same strata, but the surface of the ground was
ten feet higher than at the plaintiff's well. The evidence was that
both wells were supplied from the underground water. The defend-
ant made a drain by which sewage was discharged into his well,
whence it flowed into the underground water, and thereby fouled
the water in the plaintiff's well.
On these facts PEARSON, J., gave judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed.
Cookson, Q. C., Webster, Q. C., and De Castro, for the appel-
lant.
Sir F. Hersehlell, S. G., Warmington, Q. C., and Vaughan
Hawkins, for the respondent.
BRETT, Mf. R.-In this case the defendant was possessed of a
well upon his own property, and, at one time he used it merely as
a well, but afterwards he used the shaft of the well in a manner
inconsistent with its being a well, and allowed sewage to flow into
the shaft of that which had been a well. It cannot be denied that
the shaft was artificial, and, therefore, the defendant had collected
a quantity of-sewage in an artificial reservoir. The plaintiff, at a
distance from that-the distance being wholly immaterial-sinks a
well to a lower level than the bottom of the defendant's artificial
shaft. The sewage which was collected in the artificial shaft on the
defendant's land has, by what the plaintiff has done on his own
land, gone through or been drawn through, so as to get into the
BALLARD v. T MLINSON.
percolating water, below the defendant's land. It is said, that if the
plaintiff had done nothing with regard to his well, the sewage col-
lected in the defendant's shaft would not have got into the perco-
lating water beneath his land; ori if it had, that the water would
have remained under his land; and, further, that, if it had got into
the water below the defendant's well, it would not have got into the
plaintiff's well, but for the mode in whieh he used the well. In
the result, when the plaintiff used his own well by means of a pump,
he drew into it the water which then came from the percolated
water beneath his own well, and came there adult6rated by the sew-
age, which had been in the artificial shaft on the defendant's land.
It was clear that the water drawn up by the plaintiff into his well,
was substantially adulterated and fouled. Then arises the question
whether, in such circumstances, the plaintiff can maintain an ac-
tion. The question is certainly in respect of water percolating in
an unknown channel under the surface of the ground, and, to my
mind, the depth makes no difference. It is clear law that no one
has any property in percolating water below the surface of the
earth, even whilst it is under his land. But it is equally clear that
everyone has a right to appropriate that percolating water, at all
events whilst it is under his land. No one has any property in
it-no one has any right to have it come on to his land, but every-
one has an unlimited right to appropriate it whilst it is under his
land, and may take it all, so as to prevent it going on to the land
of others. His neighbor also below him has an equal right, before
the person above has taken and appropriated it, to take it all. He
has a right to take it to the extent that he may cause the water of
the land above to come upon his land and to take it so as abso-
lutely to dry the land above. Therefore no one has any property
in percolating water, but everyone has a right to appropriate the
whole of it.
Then arises the question as to whether, in respect of such water,
any of those persons has any rights whatever as against the others.
I take it that this percolating water is a common reservoir or source
in which no one has any property, but from which anyone has a
right to appropriate any quantity. Then the question is whether any-
one who has that unlimited right of appropriation, but has no greater
rights than any of the others who have it, has a right to contam-
inate the common reservoir, or whether he is bound not to do any-
thing which shall prevent, not only his immediate neighbors, but
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any one of those who have that unlimited right, from obtaining its
true value. It is said that the defendant in polluting this common
source, did not pollute that in which the plaintiff had any property.
That is true. If all the plaintiff can show is that the common
source was contaminated, he cannot before he has appropriated any
part of it, maintain any action in respect of the contamination. I
do not think that a man can, by experimenting off or on his own
land, and finding that the water was contaminated before it came on
to his land, maintain an action, for the water did not belong to him,
and he had not appropriated it. But it does not follow that he can-
not maintain an action when he has appropriated it, and finds that
the water which he had a right to appropriate, has been contam-
inated by that which another person has done to the common source;
that is, although no one has any property in that source, yet inas-
much as everyone has a right to appropriate it, he has a right to
appropriate it in the natural state, and no one has a right to con-
taminate the common source so as to prevent his neighbor having
his right of appropriation.
The next point was that, assuming that to be true, yet, if the
person who has that right of appropriation can only exercise it, or
has done so by artificial means, to such an extent that if he had
not used those means, the water he took would not have been con-
taminated, then the percolated water which be got, must be said to
have been polluted by his act, and, therefore, he could not maintain
an action. I cannot think that that is a true proposition. The
question of natural, as distinguished from unnatural user never
applies to a plaintiff. A man has a right to exercise that natural
user. with all the skill of which he is capable. That question is
applicable to a defendant. Therefore, it seems to me, that as long
as a plaintiff does not use any means which, as regards his neighbor,
are unlawful, but only uses lawful means, however artificial or exten-
sive those means may be, he has a right to use them, and the right
to appropriate the common source is not diminished by reason of
his using those means. Therefore, however he may appropriate
the water from the common source, he has a right to have that
source uncontaminated by any act of any other person. The ques-
tion of natural or unnatural user only goes to this, that, although a
defendant does contaminate water or anything else which goes on to
his neighbor's land, yet, if that act is only the natural-user of the
land, then, although by that act lie does injure his neighbor, he is
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not liable, because otherwise he cannot use his land at all. I must
say, further, with regard to this common source in respect of which
a right of appropriation belongs to every one, the question does not
depend upon persons being contiguous neighbors, but if it can be
shown that in fact the defendant has contaminated the common
source, it signifies not how far the plaintiff is from him, if it is
proved that he has been injured by what the defendant has done.
Therefore, upon this question which is not governed by authority,
I cannot agree with the decision of the judge. The nearest case
to the present is Womersley v. Church, 17 L. T. N. S.) 190, which,
I think, does show that the first proposition of the defendant's
counsel was wrong. But I do not think that it governs the second
point, which is glanced at in Whaley v. Laivg, 2 H. & Ni. 476, to
show that the effect of the plaintiff using artificial means does not
prevent him exercising his right; but I confess that the second
point requires less authority, and is less difficult than the other.
I am of opinion that we must disagree with the judgment of
PEARSON, J., upon the ground that no one has any property in
percolating water, which, as it comes from a common source, every-
one has a right to appropriate, but no one has a right to injure.
COTTON and LINDLEY, L.JJ., delivered concurring opinions.
The decision of Mr. Justice PEARSON
in the court below was founded upon the
proposition that," as the defendants were
clearly entitled to pump every drop of
water out of their well and leave the
plaintiff with none, it would be no differ-
ence in principle if they deprived him of
the water by rendering it unfit for use ;"
and similar views seem to have been en-
tertained in Upjohn v. Richland Township,
46 Mich. 549; Greencastle v. Hazelett,
23 Ind. 186 ; Brown v. hllus, 27 Conn.
84.
The fallacy of this reasoning is abund-
antly shown by the judgments in the case
on appeal. It does not follow that because
I have a right to use a thing on my own
land, I may lawfully send it into my
neighbor's premises in a condition to
work an injury to him.
And the case of polluting the water and
allowing it to flow in its impure state
from the defendant's well itself into the
plaintiff's well, is not unlike the case of
drawing out the water by the defendants,
using it for some purpose which contam-
inated it, and then discharging it on the
surface, or elsewhere, where it flowed
on to the plaintiff's premises and caused
damage. The American cases, therefore,
while recognising to its fullest extent the
right of every landowner to use, detain,
and even totally abstract all underground
percolating water, as held in Chase v.
Silverstone, 62 Me. 175 ; 1oath v. Dris-
coll, 20 Conn. 533; Wheatley v. Baugh,
25 Penn. St. 528 ; Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294; and many other cases,
yet quite agree with the decision in Bal-
lard v. Tomlinson, that he is liable for
corrupting it, and thus causing injury to
the well of an adjoining owner.
Thus in Ball v. -Vye, 99 Mass. 584,
FOSTER, J., says, " To suffer filthy
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water from a vault to percolate or filter
through the soil into the land of a con-
tiguous proprietor, to the injury of his
well or cellar, where it is done habitually
and within the knowledge of the party
who maintains the vault, whether it
passes above ground or below, is itself
an actionable tort." See also lWahle v.
Reinbach, 76 Ill. 323; Tate v. Parrish,
7 T. B. Mon. 325; Clark v. Lawrence,
6 Jones Eq. 83.
It is on this ground that recovery is
often had against gas companies for so
affecting underground water as to injure
the adjoining wells. See Ottawa Gas
Light Co. v. Graham, 28 Il1. 73; s. c.
35 Id. 346 ; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Mur-
phy, 39 Penn. St. 257; Columbus Gas
Light Co. v. Freeland, 12 Ohio St. 392.
The ground of liability in all such
cases is obvious and simple, and if the
principle be kept steadily in mind it will
lead to a satisfactory conclusion in them
all. That principle is, that every man
is bound to keep all his dangerous things
and substance on his own premises at his
peril ; and if he fails to do so, and they
escape and injure others, he is liable.
Therefore it is, if his animals stray away
and injure his neighbor's crops he is re-
sponsible. At common law he must keep
them at home: Rust v. Low, 6 Mass.
94; fhayer v. Arnold, 4 Met. 589;
Tewksbury v. Bucklin, 7 N. H. 518;
Little v. Lathrop, 5 Greenl. 356 : Kee-
nan v. Cavanaugh, 44 Vt. 268.
If his falling wall crush his neighbor's
shrubbery or fruit trees, the latter, as the
more innocent of the two persons, has
an undoubted claim to compensation:
Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, in
which a very excellent opinion was given
by GRA, C. J. "
If the roots from his fruit or shade
trees penetrate the neighbor's soil and
undermine his walls, or affect his well,
the liability is clear: Buckin~qham v.
Elliott, Sup. Ct. Miss., Feb. 9th 1885,
20 Cent. L. J. 496.
If the owner of a deadly upas tree,
or a yew, allows its limbs to extend over
his division line, and the neighbor's cat-
tle, browsing thereon, are poisoned, the
owner of the tree must make the damage
good: Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial
Board, 4 Ex. Div. 5. And see Lambert
v. Bessey, T. Raysn. 421.
It is on the same ground that farmers
are often liable for allowing fires to es-
cape from their premises and consume
their neighbor's fences or buildings:
Barnardv. Poor, 21 Pick. 378; Higgins
v. Dewey, 107 Mass. 494.
So of snow falling from one's roof:
Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 106 Mass.
194.
If noxious gases, fumes or odors es-
cape from A.'s works and pass through
the air to the injury of his neighbor's
health, comfort or property, the latter's
remedy is perfect: St. Helen's Smelting
Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. of L. Cas. 642 ;
S. C. 4 B. & S. 608 ; Fay T. Whitman,
100 Mass. 76 ; Cooper v. Randall, 53
Ill. 24; IFalter v. Selfe, 4 fDeG. & Sm.
315.
If one artificially accumulates a large
body of water on his own land for his
own benefit, and through this artificial
pressure some of it escapes on to his
neighbor's premises, and injures his well
or floods his cellar, the party causing the
injury is undoubtedly liable, whether it
escapes by percolation, as in WFilson v.
Nrew Bedford, 108 Mass. 261; Pixleyv.
Clark, 35 N. Y. 520; Snow v. White-
head, 24 Am. L. Reg. 230 and note; or
by overflowing the surface, as in Cahill
v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324; Gray V.
Barris, 107 Mass. 492; or by under-
ground currents, as in Fetcher v. Ry-
lands, L. R., 1 Ex. 265 ; s. c. 3 H. L.
Cas. 330.
If by the use of powerful or dangerous
chemicals, or other substances, A. cor-
rupts and poisons a surface watercourse
he is responsible to the party below who
suffers thereby : 3ferrifield v. Lombard,
13 Allen 16; Richmond Mfg. Co. v. At-
lantic De Lain Co., 10 R. I. 106 ; Stock-
